This paper presents a simple model of resource extraction where preferences are defined over the individual's consumption level, her effort and the comparison of her consumption with that of other members of the community. Our specification captures the intuition that lies behind the growing body of empirical evidence that places interpersonal comparisons as a key determinant of wellbeing. We consider the effect of consumption externalities under two alternative property-rights regimes: perfect property rights and open access. We identify two dimensions along which consumption externalities distort the efficient exploitation of resources, or, in the case of open access, aggravate the overexploitation of resources: (i) the static trade-off between consumption and leisure, and (ii) the dynamic trade-off between current and future consumption. In general, envious agents overexploit the natural resource stock, resulting in a steady-state stock lower than the efficient level chosen by a central planner. We propose a tax mechanism to induce the first-best outcome.
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long stressed the relevance of status seeking as being an important characteristic of human behavior (see Aristotle, 1941, Rhetoric, Book II, Chapter 10; Kant, 1960, Chapter 6; Rawls, 1971, Sections 80-82; Schoeck, 1966) . In economics, it has also been long recognized that the overall level of satisfaction derived from a given level of consumption depends not only on the consumption level itself but also on how it compares to the consumption of other members of society. Though origins of this proposition can be traced as far back as Smith (1776) 2 and Veblen (1899), it was not until the work of Duesenberry (1949) , Pollak (1976) , and Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) that the idea was subjected to systematic analysis. The subsequent literature has often referred to this type of interdependence as ''catching up with the Joneses'' as in Abel (1990) , ''keeping up with the Joneses'' as in Gali (1994) , ''status'' as in Fisher and Hof (2000) or Corneo and Jeanne (2001) , ''jealousy'' as in Dupor and Liu (2003) , or ''envy'' as in Varian (1974) .
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that confirms the importance of preference interdependence. A subset of this empirical literature focuses on behavior, such as work/leisure choice, or determinants of expenditure share of positional goods. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) propose a model of relative income to rationalize the striking rise in the employment of married women in the U.S. during the past century. Using a sample of married sisters, they find that married women are 16-25% more likely to work outside the home if their sisters' husbands earn more than their own husbands. Another approach relies on questionnaires and reported levels of happiness.
3 Clark and Oswald (1996) , using a sample of 5000 British workers, find that workers' reported satisfaction levels are inversely related to their comparison wage rates, supporting the hypothesis of positional externalities. Luttmer (2005) matches individual-level panel data on well-being from the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households to census data on local average earnings. After controlling for income and other own characteristics, he finds that local average earnings have a significantly negative effect on self-reported happiness.
Research on status concerns has also been applied to environmental economics. Ng and Wang (1993) argue that relative income effects may lead to excessive levels of consumption and environmental degradation. Howarth (1996) examines the implications of status effects for the design of efficient policies for the environment, in a static, competitive economy. Howarth (2000 Howarth ( , 2006 finds that ignoring the role of consumption externalities can lead analysts to substantially overstate the optimal levels of GHG emissions; he concludes that, accounting for relative consumption effects, optimal carbon dioxide emissions taxes should be higher that those obtained under the base model in which preferences are independent of social context. Brekke and Howarth (2002) point out that the importance of social identity and relative economic status may lead individuals to significantly underestimate the full social benefits of public goods and non-market environmental services. They also extend the work of Stokey (1998) on the environmental Kuznets curve by incorporating status concerns. They show that consumption externalities exacerbate the rate of environmental degradation, because status signalling biases trade-offs between pollution abatement and consumption.
In contrast with the attention paid to the impacts of status concerns in environment economics, there is a lack of analysis of their impacts on the exploitation of renewable natural resources. Do concerns for relative consumption lead to a lower stock of renewable resource compared with the efficient solution? Would that necessarily lead to lower steady-state consumption and welfare? What tax-transfer schemes would ensure an efficient exploitation path? These questions, and others, can be explored under two different settings: a perfect property-rights scenario and a common property (or open access) scenario.
Resource economists have traditionally focused in the ''common property'' characteristics of many resources. Gordon (1954) presents a lucid treatment of the economics of common property resources.
2 Adam Smith (1776, Book V, Ch. 2) pointed out that the Englishmen of his day would be ''ashamed to appear in public'' without wearing items such as leather shoes and linen shirts.
3 Easterlin (2001) offers a unified theory that explains why cross-sectional happiness-income correlation is consistent with the absence of any time-series relationship between happiness and income. According to this theory, aspiration grows with income, and individual actions are based on false expectations. At a more fundamental level, Rayo and Becker (2007) advance the view that evolutionary forces favor a happiness function that rewards successes in relative terms. Smith (1968) focuses on the steady-state inefficiency while Plourde (1971) , Brown (1974) and Smith (1975) explicitly consider models that exhibit transitional dynamics. Brown (1974) points out that a harvest tax, which must change over time as the stock level evolves, should be introduced to correct for congestion externalities. Smith (1975) reviews the debate on the cause of the extinction of many animal species in prehistoric time, and assesses the role of ''over-hunting'' by primitive human societies.
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In this paper we connect these two streams of literature: envy and over-exploitation of renewable natural resources. Our goal is to explore the effects of relative consumption concerns on the exploitation of renewable resources.
In order to focus on the role of relative consumption, we begin our analysis by abstracting from the common property problem. As a first step, we present results derived under the assumption that the stocks of resources are privately owned. This assumption allows us to clearly identify the specific distortions associated with consumption externalities, abstracting from other external effects, such as the ones caused by congestion or common property.
We modify a standard model of renewable resource exploitation by specifying that preferences are defined over the individual's consumption level, her effort and the comparison of her consumption with that of other members of the community. 5 We identify two dimensions along which consumption externalities distort the efficient extraction of resources. First, when effort is costly, envy distorts the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. We call this the static/ steady-state distortion. Since status-seeking individuals overvalue consumption, their willingness to exert effort in order to achieve additional consumption is higher than the efficient level. As a consequence, they over-exploit the resource, resulting in a steady-state stock level that is lower than the efficient level chosen by a central planner. Second, even when effort is costless, consumption externalities might distort the willingness to shift consumption through time, resulting in an inefficient path of extraction. We call this the dynamic distortion. We explore the conditions under which these two distortions arise and we show that there exists an optimal tax scheme which induces the competitive agents to replicate the choices of the planner. The tax rate is positive and, in general, time-varying. We calibrate our model under widely used functional forms and find that, under consumption externalities, the competitive steady-state resource stock is close to three quarters of the efficient stock. Moreover the welfare costs associated with this over-exploitation are very large, about one fifth of the laissez-faire steady-state level of consumption. Once we have explored the distortions introduced by relative consumption under perfect property rights we extend our results to an environment where the resource is extracted under the open access regime. This case is perhaps more relevant in poorer countries, where property rights to many natural resource stocks are not well defined or enforced. 6 The intuition developed under private property readily extends to this framework where concerns for relative consumption only reinforce the overexploitation that characterizes imperfect property-rights arrangements. In our benchmark calibration the laissez-faire steady-state resource stock is not even one third of the efficient stock. Consumption externalities account for roughly one third of this decrease while the remaining two thirds are the result of over-exploitation due to common property. Our analysis of static and dynamic distortions is related to Fisher and Hof (2000) and Liu and Turnovsky (2005) . These authors explore the effects of relative consumption on the rate of capital accumulation and growth. They show that, when labor is endogenous, the concerns for relative consumption lead to the over-accumulation of capital. In contrast, in our context, consumption externalities lead to the under-accumulation of the stock of natural resources.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model under perfect property rights, compares the laissez-faire outcome and the centrally planned solution, explores the distortions associated with envy and characterizes the optimal fiscal policy. Section 3 deals with the effects of status concerns in the common property case. The conclusions are summarized in Section 4, while the appendices provide some technical details and revisit two important topics in the natural resource literature, amenities and extinction, in the presence of consumption externalities.
2. Consumption externalities and resource extraction under the perfect property-rights regime
Economic environment
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical infinitely lived individuals distributed uniformly along the unit interval with a total population mass of 1. Each individual privately owns a resource stock, S, fully internalizing the effects of her harvesting choices on the evolution of her stock. Each resource stock is extracted according to the following harvesting function,
where L is the representative individual's harvesting effort. The change in the stock at any point in time is the difference between the natural growth rate of the resource, G(S), and the amount harvested:
where G(.) is a strictly concave function, with G(0) = 0 and G 0 (0) > 0. Assume G(S) reaches a global maximum at S M > 0. We call S M the maximum-sustainable-yield stock level. The quantity harvested is consumed. 8 We denote by c the consumption of the representative individual, and use y and c interchangeably.
It is convenient to invert the harvesting function to get the ''effort requirement'' function
with L c > 0 and L S 0. Let C denote the average per capita consumption in our economy,
Following Abel (1990) and Carroll et al. (1997) , we assume that the utility function of our representative individual depends not only on her own level of consumption and effort, but also on the average consumption level in the economy: U(c, C, L). This specification captures the intuition that lies behind the growing body of empirical evidence reviewed earlier that places interpersonal comparisons as a key determinant of individual well-being. We denote the marginal utility of own consumption, average consumption and effort by U 1 , U 2 , and U L , respectively. The level of utility achieved by our representative individual is increasing in her own consumption but at a decreasing rate, U 1 > 0 and U 11 < 0, and decreasing in effort, U L < 0. In addition we assume that the utility function is jointly concave in individual consumption and effort with U 1L 0, so the marginal utility of consumption decreases with effort. The crucial aspect of our preference specification concerns the externality imposed by average consumption on the well-being of the individual agent. In the terminology of Dupor and Liu (2003) our agents are jealous, i.e., U 2 < 0.
Furthermore we make the following assumption to impose some restrictions on the consumption externality for symmetric increases in individual and average consumption, i.e., at C = c. Assumption 1. The utility function, evaluated at symmetric consumption, satisfies the following properties
These inequalities guarantee that along a symmetric equilibrium the direct effects (i.e., effects through the individual's own consumption), always dominate the indirect effects (i.e., effects through average consumption).
Finally, it is useful to define the following measure of the strength of envy, denoted by j, evaluated at symmetric consumption: j ÀU 2 ðc; c; LÞ U 1 ðc; c; LÞ þ U 2 ðc; c; LÞ (6) Example 1. Consider the following functions that are increasing in the ratio c/C:
(ii)
where u > 0; u 6 ¼ 1; b > 0; u þ bðu À 1Þ > 0; e ! 0; x ! 0:
For (i),(ii), and (iii), it is easy to verify that the strength of envy is a constant; in fact using (6), j = b.
Example 2. The following function also has a constant strength of envy
with 0 < d < 1; e ! 0 and x ! 0 (10)
The strength of envy is, using (6),
Notice that this utility function can be expressed as dependent of the ratio C/c, too, since 
together with (2) and the transversality condition, (12) indicates that at the margin the utility of a unit of consumption, net of the effort cost required to extract it, must be equated to the private shadow value of the resource. Eq. (13) is the standard intertemporal allocation condition that requires the equalization of the consumption rate of interest and the rate of return of the unextracted resource. The latter consists of two terms: the marginal reproduction rate of the resource and the reduction in the required effort cost when the stock is marginally more abundant.
In contrast to the optimization problem of private agents, the central planner acknowledges that each individual's consumption choice creates distortions through its effects on average consumption. Therefore he perceives the following utility specification for the representative individual, U(c, c, L). The planner chooses the levels of consumption and effort to maximize the present value of the flow of utility subject to (2), (3), and S(0) = S 0 . The first order conditions for this program, where the superscript p denotes the planner's choices, are
together with (2) and the transversality condition, lim t ! 1 c p S p e Àrt ¼ 0. The difference between the two solutions arises because the planner internalizes the negative impact of average consumption on individual welfare by adjusting the marginal utility of private consumption to take into account its marginal social cost. In a general set-up, with endogenous consumption and effort choices, consumption externalities can introduce distortions along two margins: (a) the trade-off between consumption and effort at any given time, the static/steady-state distortion, and (b) the trade-off between consumption at different points in time, the dynamic distortion. We will explore the effects of both distortions along a symmetric equilibrium where c = C. 
The steady-state distortion
Since status-seeking individuals overvalue consumption, their willingness to exert effort in order to achieve additional consumption is higher than the efficient level. As a result, at any given stock 9 The optimality conditions presented in this section are necessary for an interior optimum path. Under well-behaved preferences and reproduction functions, these conditions are also sufficient. In our analysis we assume that our necessary conditions are also sufficient. level, competitive agents choose levels of consumption and effort above the efficient levels chosen by the central planner. Let us find out if this necessarily leads to an inefficiently low steady-state stock level. The first immediate result is that, comparing (13) and (15), it is clear that the steady-state stock level, and therefore steady-state consumption, achieved in the decentralized solution coincides with the efficient solution if and only if either effort is costless (i.e., U L = 0) or the stock does not enter the harvest function (i.e., L S = 0). Now, assuming that the resource stock enters the harvesting function and effort is costly, let us compare the decentralized steady state with the efficient steady state. For this purpose, we use linear approximations of the first system, given by (12), (13) and (2), around the second, given by (14), (15) and (2) (2) and (13), we can see that deviations in the stock of resources imply deviations in consumption and effort. Our findings are summarized in the following proposition: Proposition 1.
(i) In a decentralized economy where (a) either effort is costless, or (b) the harvest function is independent of the stock, the steady-state resource stock and consumption are efficient.
(ii) In a decentralized economy where effort is endogenous (U L < 0) and the effort requirement function is decreasing in the stock (L S < 0), the steady-state resource stock is lower than the efficient stock chosen by a central planner.
1 is greater than the maximum sustainable yield stock), the laissez-faire outcome is associated with over-consumption in the steady state and an inefficiently high level of effort. If G 0 ðS d 1 Þ > 0 the laissez-faire outcome is associated with an inefficiently low level of steady-state consumption and its effects on steady-state effort is ambiguous.
In the special case where G(S) is quadratic, say G(S) = bS(1 À (S/K)), and the harvesting function takes the familiar Schaefer specification, c = gSL (Schaefer, 1957; Brander and Taylor, 1998) , where b, K and g are positive parameters, it is easy to verify that steady-state effort is monotonically decreasing in steadystate stock,
, hence steady-state effort in a decentralized economy is bigger than under the social planner, regardless of whether S d 1 is greater or smaller than the maximum sustainable yield stock.
We use the following numerical example to illustrate the results stated in Proposition 1. We consider the utility function (10) where x! 0 is the effort cost parameter. We assume the growth function G(S) = bS(1 À (S/K)) and the Schaefer harvesting function. Notice that the maximumsustainable-yield stock is S M = K/2. Setting e=0, r = 0.05, K = 1, b = g=10 and d = 0.3, we consider three cases (a) effort is costless (i.e., x= 0), (b) effort cost is low, x= 0.1, and (c) effort cost is high, x=3.
In case (a), the steady-state stock under the decentralized economy is identical to that under the planner,
In case (b), the steady-state stock under the decentralized economy is S d = 0.1368, smaller than that under the planner, S p = 0.1570, which is again below the maximum-sustainable-yield stock. 
Intuitively, relative consumption concerns trigger a process of excessive extraction of the natural resource. If the effort cost parameter is high, then at the steady state, the stock level will exceed the maximum-sustainable-yield stock, i.e., the natural reproduction rate is locally decreasing in the stock, and over-consumption can be maintained but only at the expense of an inefficiently high level of effort. On the other hand, if the effort cost parameter is low (but still positive) the steady-state stock of resources will be below the maximum-sustainable-yield stock, i.e., the reproduction rate is locally increasing in the stock, then the laissez-faire solution provides a permanently lower level of consumption relative to the efficient solution.
So far we have assumed that the steady-state stock is positive. This is plausible if the resource good is the only consumption good and the marginal utility of consumption tends to infinity as c tends to zero. If there are other consumption goods, and the marginal utility of consuming the resource good is bounded, then extinction of the resource is a definite possibility. In fact, in Appendix B.2, we show that in this case, under certain range of parameter values, the steady-state stock under the social planner is positive, while under decentralized choices, a sufficiently strong degree of envy can lead to extinction of the resource.
The dynamic distortion
The dynamic distortion arises when concerns for relative consumption cause a deviation of the private willingness to shift consumption through time from the efficient rate of change of consumption chosen by a central planner. Differentiating (12) and combining the result with (13), along a symmetric equilibrium where c = C, we obtain the following system of differential equations for the decentralized solution,
Proceeding similarly with (14) and (15) we obtain the following pair of differential equations for the efficient solutioṅ
By definition, the dynamic distortion is limited to the transitional path and therefore it is better illustrated using a simpler variant of the model where relative consumption does not introduce steady-state distortions. From Proposition 1, both steady states coincide if L c; S ð Þ ¼ L c ð Þ, and for the sake of exposition we shall make this assumption throughout Section 2.4. Then the transitional path of the competitive solution is efficient if and only if Proof. Using (21) we can express condition (20) as follows &
where all derivatives are evaluated at (c, C) = (x, x), for any x > 0. This equality holds if and only if
Under exogenous effort, this condition reduces to the result presented by Fisher and Hof (2000) in the context of a growing economy.
10
Let us illustrate the results of Proposition 2 by a few examples:
Example 3. Assume preferences are given by (7) and L = c g , with g > 0. Then, assuming 1 > mg and 0
This function is concave and homogeneous of degree (1 À mg)(1À u) in (c, C). Thus the marginal rate of substitution is constant along any ray through the origin, i.e., any line C = bc where b > 0. Using Proposition 2, there are no dynamic distortions. Proof. See Appendix A. &
Optimal policy intervention
In the presence of consumption externalities the decentralized allocation of resources is not Pareto efficient. We now show that the government can restore efficiency by means of corrective taxation. Consider the decentralized economy described in Section 2.2, with a government that imposes a time varying tax, t t ð Þ, on resource extraction. The government is assumed to run a balanced budget, returning at each instant in time the amount raised through taxes as a lump sum transfer, T t ð Þ. Under this tax-and-transfer program, the individual, taking T as given, perceives the following relationship between her level of extraction and her consumption c ¼ ð1 À tÞy þ T i.e., she takes it that dc/dy = 1 À t. The consumer chooses the time path y r , where the superscript r denotes variables under the scenario with tax or regulations, to maximize
The necessary conditions for the representative consumer are
Differentiate (24) with respect to time
Combining Eqs. (26) and (25), we get
Suppose the government set t(t) as follows: (28) then, differentiating both sides of (28) with respect to t
Substituting (28) and (29) into (27), we obtain the following differential equation that together with (23) describes the dynamics of the competitive solution under our tax scheme:
This equation coincides with (18) and therefore achieves the social optimum. Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4. Along a symmetric path, c = C, the efficient equilibrium can be decentralized by setting a tax on resource extraction at each point in time equal to
In general t will be time-varying along the transitional path converging to a positive constant at the steady state. Furthermore our restrictions on preferences (Assumption 1) imply that 0 < t< 1.
Calibrating the effects of the externality under the perfect property-rights regime
Consider an economy populated by a representative individual endowed with preferences given by (7). Multiplicative relative consumption has been widely used, see for example Abel (1990) , Gali (1994) , Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) . In the competitive solution the individual takes C as given and chooses c to maximize subject to (2) and S(0) = S 0 . Evaluating the optimality conditions along a symmetric equilibrium path where C = c, we obtain
Consider the following harvesting and natural resource reproduction functions,
GðSÞ ¼ S l
with 1 À g ð Þ a 1, 1 À a ð Þ g 1 and 0 < l < 1. Our harvesting function nests the popular Schaefer harvesting function, where g = a = 1, and the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function, where a+ g = 1 (Brown, 1974; Smith, 1975) 
Combining (34), (35), (33) and (2) we get a system of two differential equations that together with the initial stock of resources and the transversality condition fully describes the dynamic behavior of our model. In the unique steady state, the stock of natural resources satisfies
It is straightforward to show that the steady-state stock of natural resources, S . We calibrate our model to illustrate the quantitative effects of relative consumption in the steadystate stock of resources, consumption, effort, and welfare. Our measure of the welfare cost of the distortion is standard: we denote by w the negative of the percentage increase in individual (and average) steady-state consumption that an agent living in the competitive world must receive in order to enjoy the same welfare level as that of an agent living in the steady state of the planned economy.
Notice that given this definition welfare losses are represented by negative values of w and gains by positive ones.
14 In our benchmark calibration, we use the Schaefer harvesting function, we set the rate of time preference to the standard value in the literature r = 0.05, the stock elasticity of the reproduction function l = .5, and the parameter that governs the disutility of effort m= 0.2. Fig. 1 conducts extensive sensitivity analysis around these parameter choices.
12 Our numerical results are based on a reproduction function strictly increasing in the resource stock. Although this specification is more restrictive than our previous analytical results, we believe that in the resource extraction context the increasing range of this function is the empirically relevant one. 13 In order to ensure that the planner's optimization problem is strictly concave in c we impose the restriction m/g < 1. 
. Admittedly, w overstates the true welfare cost since it ignores the welfare effects along the transition. Nonetheless given the size of the welfare costs associated with the steady state distortion we believe our measure is a good proxy for the overall welfare costs of the distortion from any set of initial conditions. See Alvarez-Cuadrado (2007) for an analysis of the welfare costs along the transitional path in the context of a growing economy.
Since we restrict our analysis to steady-state outcomes our results are independent of the value of u. Direct evidence on the importance of relative consumption, captured by b is sparse.
The literature on the equity premium puzzle suggests that only relative consumption matters; see Abel (1990) , Gali (1994) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . Easterlin (1995) and Frey and Stutzer (2002) evaluate the time series and cross-sectional properties of several measures of self-reported happiness. Their findings are consistent with preference specifications that again place most of the weight on relative consumption. Alpizar et al. (2005) conduct several experiments to assess the importance of relative consumption. In the case of cars and housing their median estimate for the weight of relative consumption lies between 0.5 and 0.75. Finally, Howarth (2000) , exploring the impact of relative consumption on climate change, suggests a weight on status in the order of one third. A similar value is chosen by Wendner and Goulder (2008) after a review of the empirical literature. In our context, this is equivalent to b = 0.5. We use this value for our benchmark calibration and explore its sensitivity to the range of reported estimates.
As reported in Table 1 , at the steady state of our benchmark calibration (in bold numerals), the competitive stock of resources is three fourths of the efficient stock. As a result, there is a shortfall in consumption equal to one eighth of the efficient level and the laissez-faire level of effort exceeds the efficient level by approximately 15%. This combination of lower consumption and higher effort is associated with a welfare cost, expressed in units of permanent consumption, close to one sixth of the competitive level of consumption. Table 1 zero to more than eight tenths, the competitive stock of resources falls to one half of the efficient stock. The diminishing returns in the resource reproduction function limit the drop in consumption that remains close to two thirds of the efficient level, but despite this, the associated welfare costs, as a result of diminishing marginal utility, more than double relative to our benchmark calibration. Finally, in line with Brekke and Howarth (2002, p. 80 ) the optimal tax rate in our benchmark calibration, which is equal to the weight of relative consumption, is one third. Since relative consumption concerns affect the steady-state allocation of resources through the trade-off between consumption and effort, the distortion is very sensitive to changes in m. As effort becomes more costly, m = 0.4, the planner reduces both consumption and effort to reach a steady state with a relatively high stock of resources. Since competitive agents overvalue consumption they exert an inefficiently high level of effort that eventually runs the stock of resources down to only one half of the efficient level. The negative welfare figures are of course welfare costs. They are quite large, equivalent to a consumption loss of 52% of the steady state laissez faire level. Fig. 1 explores the sensitivity of the distortion in the stock of resources to percentage changes in our benchmark parameters. In line with the results reported in Table 1 the size of the distortion increases quickly both on the importance of relative consumption and on the disutility of effort. The steady-state results for the constant returns to scale extraction function are presented in Table   2 . Under our benchmark calibration, a = 0.5, the competitive stock of resources and the level of consumption are only two thirds and four fifths of their efficient counterparts respectively. Since under our benchmark parameter values steady-state effort is not distorted, this lower level of consumption is associated with a welfare cost close to one fourth of the laissez-faire level of consumption. As in the constant returns to scale case, increases in the weight of relative consumption, b, or increases on the disutility of effort, m, exacerbate the effects of the distortion and its welfare costs.
Consumption externalities under open access
We now turn to the other extreme and assume that the resource is exploited under the open access regime. We model open access by assuming that the resource is extracted by a continuum of individuals; they are indexed by i, where i is a real number in the interval 0; 1 ½ . Individuals are identical in all respects. There is only one resource stock, denoted by S. Let y i (t) denote individual i's rate of resource extraction at time t. Aggregate extraction at time t is Y(t) where
The evolution of the resource stock isṠðtÞ ¼ GðSðtÞÞ À YðtÞ. Thus the harvest y i of any agent i has a negligible impact on the resource stock. Consequently, agent i takes the time path Y(t) as given and independent of her actions. We maintain the same assumptions on preferences and harvesting technology introduced in the private property rights section. 
Laissez-faire outcome under open access
We assume that all output is consumed. Then c i = y i , and C = Y. Inverting the harvesting function we obtain the effort requirement of the i th individual, L i ¼ L i y i ; S ð Þ. This agent takes the time path Y(t) as given and chooses the time path y i (t) to maximize her life-time utility Z 1 0 e Àrt Uðc i ; C; L i ðc i ; SÞÞ dt subject toṠðtÞ ¼ GðSðtÞÞ À CðtÞ. Pointwise maximization gives the first order condition
Remark. Eq. (37) has a solution c 2 0; 1 ð Þ if we use the functions (8) or (10), but does not have a solution if we use (7).
The second order condition is
In a symmetric equilibrium, C = c, and thus the laissez-faire harvest level c satisfies 
As before, we assume that Let us specialize this result by using the functional form (10) for the utility function, and (32) for the harvest function. Then Eq. (38) becomes
In the case a=1, this gives a linear and increasing function c(S). Then its intersection with the curve G(S) gives a unique interior steady state stock level S oa , provided that
Proposition 5. Assume the functional forms (10) and (32)with a = 1. Then, provided inequality (39) holds, there is a unique interior steady state S oa > 0. An increase in the strength of envy (an increase in d) will shift the curve c(S) up, reducing the steady-state stock level. If envy is very strong, then (39) cannot be satisfied, and the only steady state is extinction of the resource stock.
Remark. If a 2 0; 1 ð Þ, there may exist many interior steady state stock levels. Suppose there are two. Then the smaller one is unstable and the bigger one is stable. An in the strength of envy (an increase in d) will shift the curve c(S) up, reducing the stable steady-state stock level, and raising the unstable one.
Comparing steady states under alternative regimes
The following proposition compares the steady-state stock under open access with that under the perfect property-rights regime.
Proposition 6. The steady-state stock under open access is smaller than the steady-state stock of the representative individual under the perfect property-rights regime.
Proof. Under open access, the steady-state stock is obtained by solving the following pair of equations
Under the perfect property-rights regime, the two equations are 
since by assumption the social planner's objective function is concave in c. It follows that the open-access regime results in a lower steady-state stock level.
Efficiency-inducing taxes
In order to induce competitive agents under a common property arrangement to replicate the planner's solution, we propose two taxes t 1 (t) and t 2 (t) that follow different dynamics. In principle in the presence of two external effects, over-exploitation of the resource resulting from relative consumption and from the absence of perfect property rights, we will need two tax instruments with different dynamics to mimic the efficient solution.
Recall that the central planner's solution satisfies the equations
These two equations imply that
Consider the decentralized economy with a government that imposes a time varying tax, t t ð Þ ¼ t 1 ðtÞ þ t 2 ðtÞ, on resource extraction. The government runs a balanced budget, returning at each instant in time the amount raised through taxes as a lump sum transfer, T t ð Þ. Under this scheme, the individual, taking T as given, perceives the following relationship between her level of extraction and her consumption c ¼ ð1 À t 1 À t 2 Þy þ T i.e., she takes it that dc/dy = 1 À t 1 À t 2 . The consumer chooses the time path y r , where the superscript r denotes variables under the scenario with government tax or regulations, to maximize
Substituting (49) into (48) we get
which shows that the open access extraction path under corrective taxation mimics the central planner's path, as given by (42).
Numerical results
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical individuals endowed with preferences given by (10). These agents have access to the same Schaefer harvesting technology and we assume the reproduction of the resource is given by (33). We calibrate our model to compare the effects of relative consumption in the steady-state stock of resources, consumption, effort, and welfare under private and common property arrangements. We set the rate of reproduction of the resource, l = .5, and the rate of time preference, r = 0.05, equal to our previous calibration. Under our preferences specification (10), the value suggested by Brekke and Howarth (2002) for the relativity concerns implies d= 0.33. Finally, we choose the effort parameters to obtain steady-state distortions under private property of the resource stock that are equal to the ones obtained with multiplicative relative consumption in Section 2. Table 3 summarizes our results and explores its sensitivity to variations of the importance of relative consumption.
As in Section 2, in the steady state under private property the competitive stock of resources and consumption are respectively three fourths and one eighth of their efficient counterparts, while effort is 15% above the efficient level. When the resource is harvested under open access the competitive stock of resources is barely one third of the efficient stock. Consumption externalities account for roughly one third of this decrease while the remaining two thirds are the result of over-exploitation due to common property. The level of consumption associated with the steady state competitive stock of resources is barely half of the efficient level while effort exceeds by almost 80% the efficient level. The introduction of the tragedy of commons only exacerbates the distortions associated with relative consumption. In our benchmark calibration, the welfare losses associated with both external effects are huge, equivalent to a consumption loss three times as large as the steady state laissez faire level. As we increase the importance of relativity concerns, as measured by d, both the stock of resources and consumption fall while effort increases. Finally, since both externalities are complementary, increases in the first tax rate, t 1 , in response to increases in the importance of relative consumption, reduce the external effect associated with open access and therefore are associated with decreases in the second tax rate, t 2 .
Conclusions
The negative welfare consequences of competitive consumption have been long noted by social and natural scientists. In the words of the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins (1986, p. 184): Why, for instance, are trees in the forest so tall? The short answer is that all the other trees are tall, so no one tree can afford not to be. It would be overshadowed if it did. . . But if only they were all shorter, if only there could be some sort of trade-union agreement to lower the recognized height of the canopy in forests, all the trees would benefit. They would be competing with each other in the canopy for exactly the same sun light, but they would all have ''paid'' much smaller growing costs to get into the canopy.
Only recently has the economic profession begun to pay closer attention to the welfare consequences of consumption externalities. In this paper we have presented a simple model of resource extraction where preferences are defined over the individual's consumption level, her effort, and the comparison of her consumption with that of other members of the community. Our specification captures the intuition that lies behind the growing body of empirical evidence that places interpersonal comparisons as a key determinant of well-being. We find that envious individuals ignore the negative effects that their extraction choices impose on the welfare of their neighbors; as a result they over-exploit the natural resource, resulting in an inefficiently low steady-state stock.
We have identified two dimensions along which consumption externalities distort the efficient extraction of resources. In the case where effort is endogenous, envy distorts the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and effort, the static/steady state distortion. Even when effort is costless, consumption externalities might distort the willingness to shift consumption through time and therefore the path of extraction displays a dynamic distortion. These distortions provide a new rationale for the increasing concerns about over-exploitation of resources, possible extinction, and the general deterioration of the environment caused by human activities. Our results highlight an important scope for government intervention even in the absence of the externalities associated with common property arrangements. In a world where agents envy the consumption of their neighbors, an appropriately chosen harvesting tax must be imposed to induce the preservation of the natural resource and improve welfare. Our results are particularly important for developing economies because they have greater macroeconomic dependence on renewable resources.
Proof of Part (ii):
Assume that U L < 0 and L S < 0. Then, since the shadow price c is positive, at the steady state r À G 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3
Under decentralized choices, we have the following system of equations 
Similarly, under the social planner, we have the system
Then the stable branch of the saddlepoint under the social planner is upward sloping, with slope
It is clear that
Appendix B. Additional results with consumption externalities under the perfect property-rights regime
B.1. A model with amenity values
In addition to being consumption goods or production inputs, some natural resources generate a variety of amenity services that include, for instance, the recreational and aesthetic values associated with a well-preserved environment. 15 Following Krautkraemer (1985) we assume that the owner of a resource stock not only earns income from extraction, but also enjoys other amenities from the preservation of the stock. To capture this idea, we adopt the following preference specification for our representative individual, The experimental literature on relative consumption highlights important differences in the degree of comparison among different consumption goods. In general, easily observable goods or services, such as housing or cars, are subject to stronger externalities than unobservable ones, such as medical insurance or leisure. In line with this evidence, we make the extreme assumption that interpersonal comparisons do not involve comparing the amenity services provided by the stock of natural resources.
A symmetric steady state is reached when C = c = G(S 1 ) andċ ¼ 0 and therefore the steady-state stock of resources satisfies
It is straightforward to show that the steady-state stock of natural resources, S 1 , is unique.
Furthermore, increases in the importance of relative consumption, captured by b, decrease the steady-state stock of resources. Intuitively increases in the importance of relative consumption increase the willingness of the competitive agent to increase extraction at the cost of lowering the amenity services provided by the unexploited resource. This process of over-extraction is associated with a lower steady-state stock of the natural resource. Finally, it is worth noticing that the efficient stock of resources is given by (53) with b = 0 and therefore is always larger than the laissez-faire solution.
B.2. A model with extinction of privately owned resource stocks
If the marginal utility of consumption, evaluated at c = 0, is infinite, then given our assumption that each agent has perfect property rights over her own resource stock it is not possible that the market outcome, with agents maximizing over an infinite horizon, will result in the extinction of the resource. 16 We now show that if the marginal utility of consumption from harvested resources, evaluated at c = 0, is finite, then under certain parameter values, the social planner would want to maintain a positive stock level, but the market outcome results in extinction, even though each individual has full control of her own resource stock.
Assume the utility function is a function of a basic good x, and a resource good (e.g. timber furniture), the consumption of which is denoted by c. We posit in the case where envy applies only to the consumption of the resource good. We specify the utility function Uðx; c; C; LÞ ¼ vðxÞ þ
where vðxÞ is a concave and increasing function, and 0 < b < m < 1, 0 < 1 + bÀ m< 1.
1. The harvesting function is y = LS, and as before the resource harvested is consumed, c = y. Then L = cS À1 . Substitution yields
Assume that at each point of time, each agent is endowed with a fixed flowx > 0 of a non-storable basic good, so her consumption of this good is equal tox. Assume G(S) is strictly concave, with Gð0Þ ¼ 0 ¼ GðSÞ for someS > 0. Then G(S)/S is a decreasing function, and 
The right-hand side of (57) 
